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Introduction
This chapter examines a recent challenge to the idea of a humanistically oriented 
historiography.1 I refer to this recent challenge as ‘the new challenge’, in order 
to distinguish it from a better-known criticism of the autonomy of historical 
explanations that was articulated by Hempel in the 1940s and 1950s: a criticism 
which I will refer to as ‘the old challenge’. In speaking of a new challenge, I 
do not refer to a school of thought whose members explicitly identify with a 
set of tenets or share a common manifesto. I refer rather to a cluster of claims 
that share a certain family resemblance, one that is sufficiently robust to justify 
seeing them as emerging from a similar set of metaphilosophical assumptions. 
Proponents of the new challenge (Chakrabarty 2009; Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016; 
Latour 2017) argue that the advent of the Anthropocene, a geological period in 
which humankind has become a significant geological force capable of initiating 
environmental changes, spells the end of the distinction between the historical 
and the natural past. According to the new challenge, narratives of historical 
development should go well beyond the relatively recent human past (with which 
historical narratives have been traditionally concerned) and view human history 
in the context of a deeper, longer-term geological history. Advocates of the new 
challenge argue that the distinction between the historical and the natural 
past (a distinction that was pivotal to the defence of a humanistically oriented 
historiography against the old challenge) relies on questionable anthropocentric 
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assumptions that treat human beings as if they were not basically or essentially 
natural beings. They condemn the distinction between the historical and the 
natural past as an unacceptable dichotomy committed to a form of human 
exceptionalism which pits the human being against the rest of nature.
There is a soft and a hard version of the new challenge. The soft version claims 
that traditional histories, the history of the Egyptian and the Roman civilization, 
for example, and long-term geological histories, should criss-cross. For if these 
two histories are kept in complete isolation from one another, then it is very 
difficult to expose human activity as a crucial factor in climate change. It is only 
when these different histories are entangled that it is possible to see, for example, 
that ‘James Watt’s design of the steam engine in 1784’ coincides with the 
‘beginning of growing global concentrations of carbon dioxide and methane’ in 
the air trapped in polar ice (Crutzen 2002: 23), or that the cooling of the climate 
known as ‘the little ice age’ followed the drastic fall in the indigenous population 
after Columbus’s ‘discovery’ of America (Lewis and Maslin 2015: 175–6). This 
kind of criss-crossing is not new. But whereas traditional histories tended to 
mention the way in which nature impinges upon civilization (they discussed, for 
example, the ways in which draughts impacted upon Pharaohs’s abilities to rule 
effectively in ancient Egypt), Anthropocene narratives change the direction of 
fit: they expose the influence that civilization has on nature rather than nature on 
civilization. The soft version of the new challenge does not deny that longer term, 
‘deep’ geological histories and the history of civilizations are different kinds of 
histories, with different methods, suited to answer different kinds of questions: 
an argument against the compartmentalization of knowledge is not the same as 
an argument against disciplinary boundaries. The hard version, however, is a 
different kettle of fish and considerably more radical than its soft counterpart. 
It argues not merely against the compartmentalization of knowledge which 
prevents the historian of ancient civilization from knowing anything about the 
findings of geologists but also against the very idea of disciplinary boundaries 
which was invoked to defend the possibility of a humanistically oriented 
historiography against the old Hempelian challenge. While the old challenge 
sought to reduce historical explanations to scientific ones, the new challenge, in 
its most radical form, undermines the disciplinary boundaries between science 
and history by denying that the concept of historical agency is sui generis. By 
replacing the sui generis category of ‘historical agent’ with an undifferentiated 
concept that includes microbes, characters in novels and military commanders 
alike, the most radical form of the new challenge does away with the distinction 
between rational and causal explanations that demarcated the domain of history 
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(traditionally understood) from that of science. I take Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz to be articulating, for the most 
part, a soft version of the challenge, calling for entanglement, and Bruno Latour 
as articulating the more radical version, calling for abolition. The dividing line 
between these two versions of the challenge, however, is not always clear cut, and 
the distinction between the two is more like one that ought, in principle, to be 
made than one that is actually drawn in practice. It is the abolitionist view that I 
am mostly concerned with in this chapter, a view from which those who call for 
entanglement do not always sufficiently distance themselves.2
This chapter has two goals. First it defends a humanistically oriented 
historiography against the charge that it is inextricable from an unacceptable 
form of human exceptionalism. Humanistically oriented historiography, I argue, 
is not the same as human history. The subject matter of a humanistically oriented 
historiography is not humans, understood as a biological species, and the time 
of humans on planet earth, but the norms which govern any beings whose 
conduct can be explained as responding to certain normative demands rather 
than as conforming to natural laws. The new challenge to the possibility of a 
humanistically oriented historiography conflates the idea of the historical past 
with that of the human past. The historical past is not the human past; it is the 
past understood in a way that is different from the way in which it is approached 
by, say, the palaeontologist or the geologist. And because what defines the 
historical past is how it is explained, the historical past is not an insignificantly 
brief temporal segment of the geological past (the time of the humans, or the 
time when written records began) because it is not a segment of time at all but a 
different way of approaching and understanding what happened in the past. It is 
the conflation of the historical with the human past that gives rise to the objection 
that traditional histories are premised upon a form of human exceptionalism. 
Second, this chapter resists the weakening of the notion of historical agency that 
inevitably follows from denying the distinction between the historical and the 
natural past. It argues that if there were no distinction between the historical and 
the natural past, no disciplinary boundaries between history and science and no 
distinction between historical and other kinds of agents, then the anticipation 
of the future would become a mere spectator’s sport analogous to the activity of 
predicting the weather.
To be clear, the goal of this chapter is not to take issue with geologists who 
claim that in years to come the rocks will bear traces of a sudden acceleration 
in climate changes caused by human activity, changes comparable to those 
which occurred in the transition from the Cretaceous to the Tertiary, when it 
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is widely believed that the impact of a meteor led to the disappearance of the 
dinosaurs (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016: 13). This chapter takes issue not with 
climate scientists but with those philosophers of history and science who claim 
that the appropriate response to the findings of the science of climate change is 
to undo the nature-culture distinction. In defending the distinction between the 
natural and the historical past this chapter seeks to make room (philosophically 
speaking) for the possibility that the future climate of the planet may be shaped 
by responding to environmentally friendly norms, rather than merely forecast 
as the inevitable consequence of climate changes which humans have set in 
motion qua forces of nature. This chapter does not deny that by deforesting land 
and burning fossil fuels humans have initiated or causally contributed to global 
warming. What it argues is that it is only qua historical agents that they can look 
to the future as something that they can shape by changing the norms to which 
they responded in the past rather than as something that they merely facilitate by 
playing a role analogous to that of yeast in the chemical process of fermentation.
The old challenge
Before the so-called ‘narrativist turn’ much analytic philosophy of history was 
preoccupied with the task of specifying the nature of the methodologies at work 
in the sciences.3 The question which dominated the debate was whether historical 
explanations of past events are covert retrodictions which share the same logical 
structure as scientific predictions of future events or whether, on the other hand, 
they have a completely different logical form. Hempel (1942) argued that the 
nomological model of explanation, according to which to explain something 
is to subsume the explanandum under a general law, can be employed either to 
predict the future or to retrodict the past. The fact that historians are typically 
concerned with the past rather than the future does not entail that historical 
explanations are different in kind from scientific explanations if we accept that 
historical explanations of past events have the same logical form as scientific 
predictions of future ones. The historian’s focus on the past and the scientist’s 
focus on the future, for Hempel, merely obscures the fact that scientific and 
historical explanations share the same (nomological) form and that historical 
explanations at best differ from scientific ones only in degree, in so far as the 
generalizations used by historians invoke probabilistic laws which cannot be 
falsified by a single counter-instance.4
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W. H. Dray (1957, 1963)5 responded to Hempel’s argument for methodological 
unity in the sciences. He conceded that the distinction between the past and the 
present cannot be mobilized to defend the methodological autonomy of history 
but denied that the past, as understood, for example, by a cultural anthropologist 
or medieval historian, is the same past as that which is investigated by big bang 
physicists: historians do not retrodict Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon in the way 
in which astronomers retrodict the explosion of a star that occurred millions of 
years ago. While historians are concerned with the past, they are not concerned 
with the natural past. But what is this non-natural past with which historians 
are concerned? It is the study of the norms which govern the conduct of certain 
beings who are taken to be distinctive kinds of agents, that is, historical agents. 
These beings are taken to be historical agents neither because they live in the past 
rather than the present nor because they are human rather than non-human but 
because they are responsive to norms. The contrast that is relevant to a defence of 
the autonomy of history against the old challenge is not the distinction between 
the past and the present. It is the distinction between nature and culture. 
This distinction is not a distinction between humans and other ‘lesser’ beings 
because it is not an empirical taxonomy such as the one that, for example, is 
invoked to distinguish human mammals from other mammals as, for example, 
chimpanzees; it is a methodological distinction between the presuppositions 
informing forms of inquiry which serve different explanatory needs. For the sake 
of predicting the future and retrodicting the past physicists assume that nature 
is uniform, that the laws of nature are the same in the Victorian and Edwardian 
period and that water will freeze at 0°C under the reign of King Edward VII as 
well as that of Queen Victoria. For the sake of understanding historical agents, 
by contrast, historians assume that the norms by which historical agents lead 
their lives may differ from their own. From the point of view of the physicist 
‘nature has no history’. This is not because natural beings are unaffected by the 
passage of time (fruits first ripen and then rot) nor because nature never changes 
(the earth was a very different place millions of years ago than it is now) but 
because the scientific investigation of nature operates under the assumption of 
the uniformity of its underlying laws.6 By contrast, the historical investigation 
of the past operates on the assumption that agents are responsive to norms, and 
that these norms are not historically invariant. For example, historians explain 
why in plague-stricken Britain people rubbed live chickens on their wounds by 
invoking the epistemic norms prevalent at the time. What makes this explanation 
historical is not that it applies to human beings who lived in the past but that 
it explains human beings as responding to the state of medical knowledge at 
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that time, much as the behaviour of a driver who stops at a red traffic light is 
explained by invoking traffic regulations rather than by identifying natural laws. 
If the Slitheen, the Time Lords, the Daleks and the Silurians had not been alien 
fictional creatures in the TV series Dr Who, but ancient civilizations predating 
the Egyptians and the Mesopotamians, they would be appropriate subject matter 
for history even if they did not belong to the biological species ‘human’. The 
question that one should ask to establish whether certain life forms can be 
studied historically is not ‘Are they mammals?’ or ‘Are they higher mammals?’ or 
‘Are they human?’ but ‘Are they civilized?’ And if they are, then they will need to 
be understood in different ways from the rocks and the waves, not because they 
have a supernatural ‘inside’ over and above a natural/observable ‘outside’ that 
the rocks and waves do not have but because to the extent that they live by self-
given rules which they take to be binding, their behaviour cannot be explained 
as that of the sunflower which turns towards the sun, or the moon which orbits 
round its planet. Such is the nature of norms: unlike natural laws they can be 
disobeyed, but they will cast light on the behaviour of those who follow them in 
such a way as to show, for example, that the individual rubbing a live chicken on 
his wounds is not plain mad.
The distinction between nature and culture which was invoked to defend the 
methodological autonomy of history in the middle of the last century did not 
capture the divide between the human and the non-human. Nature and culture 
are distinct explicanda that are known through the presuppositions and methods 
of science and history respectively. Even if both history and science look at the 
past, they never really look at it in the same way. The big bang could never be 
explained historically, just as the significance of Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon 
could not be grasped through the methods of science. But this is not because 
Caesar has an unobservable supernatural inside which eludes the third-person 
perspective of science but because the significance of Caesar’s crossing of the 
Rubicon can be understood only against the background of Republican Law, not 
by reference to the laws of nature. Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon was an act of 
disobedience that is understood historically when it is understood in the way in 
which one explains the action of the driver who disregards a traffic regulation, 
that is, as a failure to abide by the norms of conduct dictated by Republican Law, 
rather than as a counterexample to a natural law. The defence of a humanistically 
oriented historiography against the old challenge conceived of the historical past 
neither as a segment of time that lags behind the present and grows bigger as 
each day goes by (the metaphysical view that time is a growing block) nor as 
the all-too-human past of kings and queens, of Queen Elizabeth rather than 
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the queen bee (the view that what is meant by historical time is the time of the 
humans on planet earth). The defence of the autonomy of historical explanations 
against the claim for methodological unity was premised on the assumption that 
history and natural science have different investigative goals and are governed 
by different presuppositions, presuppositions that are reflected by the adoption 
of different forms of inference. Since the defence of a humanistically oriented 
historiography against the old challenge assumed that nature is the correlative 
of a particular form of (scientific/nomological) inference and culture is the 
correlative of a different form of (historical) inference, it entailed that a change 
in the form of inference also entails a change of subject matter. The reason why 
the (historical) significance of Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon would elude an 
empirical scientist seeking to retrodict it through the application of inductive 
tools is that the application of the methods of natural science turns everything 
that it tries to explain into a natural event, just as King Midas turns everything he 
touches into gold.7 Scientists directing their methods to the study of biological 
humans do not write history; they change the subject matter because the past 
can be understood historically only when it is investigated by the methods of 
history. And the other way around too: if historians tried to explain the big bang 
in the way in which they seek to render intelligible the actions of past agents, 
they would not be writing science but rather mythological accounts of the past. 
The distinction between the historical and the natural past that was invoked to 
defend the possibility of a humanistically oriented historiography against the 
argument for methodological unity in the sciences, therefore, is not the same 
as the distinction between the human and the non-human past. Nor does the 
defining characteristic of the historical past lie in the fact that it is no longer 
present. Rather, what is no longer present constitutes the historical past in so far 
as it is looked at through the lens of beings who, as Heidegger would say, have an 
understanding of Being. Historians tracing the rise and fall of civilizations are 
not palaeontologists seeking to date the extinction of biological species through 
the study of their fossilized remains. While palaeontologists look at the fossilized 
remains of dinosaurs as providing evidence for the existence and evolution of a 
now-extinct animal species, the mummified remains of ancient Egyptians are 
of interest to humanistically oriented historians not in so far as they provide 
evidence to document the existence and evolution of a now-extinct ethnic 
group but insofar as they symbolize the belief that the preservation of the body 
is required for the soul to find an appropriate home in the afterlife. The defence 
of the idea of a historical past against the old challenge was therefore based not 
on an arbitrary divide between human and non-human animals but on the 
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assumption that to understand the past historically is to approach it as a space of 
reasons8 in which the action of historical agents are understood as abiding by (as 
well as contesting) norms.
There is much more that could be said about the defence of humanistic 
understanding against the old challenge. While in the early and mid-twentieth 
century the debate for and against methodological unity was conducted primarily 
on the terrain of philosophy of history and social science, these issues were 
also the object of extensive discussions in the philosophy of mind and action9 
where it was perhaps much clearer that the defence of the irreducibility of action 
explanation to event explanations did not hinge upon defending a dichotomy 
between humans and other beings but on the nature of the inferences that are 
adopted in different contexts of inquiry. Davidson, for example, argued that the 
mental has a normative dimension that finds no echo in scientific explanations 
(Davidson 1963); many others have argued that the explanation of action is sui 
generis because it has an irreducibly teleological dimension (Malcom 1968; von 
Wright 1971; Tanney 1995; Sehon 2005). The current debate concerning the role 
of history at the time of the Anthropocene about whether historical narratives 
should shift their focus from the relatively recent human past to a deeper past 
of the human species in order to expose the interdependence of human life on 
other species (and nature at large) seems to forget that the old defence of the 
irreducibility of humanistic explanations to naturalistic ones in its various forms 
was an argument against scientism that did not hinge upon a commitment to an 
ontological divide between the human and the non-human. It is arguably a new 
form of naturalism which is making a comeback, in a different and subtler form, 
in the new challenge.
The new challenge
The distinction between nature and culture which informed the defence of a 
humanistically oriented historiography against the old challenge has come under 
attack on the basis of reflections about what it means to live in the Anthropocene: 
a new geological epoch characterized by cataclysmic human-induced climate 
changes which could potentially lead to the extinction of human life on earth. 
Stratigraphic proof for the end of the Holocene and the beginning of the 
Anthropocene is still outstanding, and there is no consensus among geologists 
as to the identifiable beginning of this new epoch, some dating its onset to the 
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time of the first nuclear explosion in 1945 (Zalasiewciz et al. 2015), some to 
the year 1784, the date of the invention of the steam engine as a symbol of the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution (Crutzen 2002: 23), and others dating 
its onset further back to 1610, when a drastic fall in the indigenous population 
following Columbus’s ‘discovery’ of America led to a decline in atmospheric CO2 
and the cooling of the climate known as the ‘little ice age’ (Lewis and Maslin 
2015). While there is no clear consensus as to whether the Anthropocene has 
succeeded the Holocene and if so, what its precise start date is, the Anthropocene 
has increasingly been described as that slice of geological time in which humans 
have become causal forces so powerful as to be able not only to selectively 
intervene in nature but also to radically alter its course. Whether or not the 
Anthropocene will be given scientific recognition as a separate geological era is 
ultimately a matter for geologists to determine. What we are concerned here is 
not the scientific claim that the Anthropocene is a new slice of geological time, 
in which traces of human activities are being carved into the earth’s strata, but 
rather the philosophical claim that we should cast aside the distinction between 
the historical and the natural past either as philosophically dubious or as an 
obsolete categorial distinction that no longer serves our present needs. Since 
we stand on the threshold of an environmental catastrophe, so the argument 
goes, humans should see themselves in the context of a longer term, geological 
history of planet earth, one in which the history of kings and queens unfolds in 
the batting of a geological eyelid. During what, from a geological perspective, 
is an infinitesimally short period of time, human beings fought revolutions, 
waged wars and plotted against each other. During this period of time those 
same human beings enslaved members of their own species with a different skin 
colour, devised class systems which exploited large sections of humanity for the 
benefit of a selected few and created myths to provide ideological support for 
racial segregation and class exploitation. This is the focus of traditional histories: 
the domain of human affairs or the time of the human species on earth and their 
internal quarrels and conflicts. Historical narratives at this momentous time, 
where humanity is on the cusp of self-destruction, should focus on a different 
kind of time, a time long before any of the written records that professional 
historians study, to uncover the ‘deep history’ of humankind (Chakrabarty 2009: 
212). Anthropocene-inspired criticisms of the idea of a distinctively historical 
past therefore tend to highlight the brevity and comparative insignificance of 
human time – a time during which humans became the predominant species: a 
species whose skills in mastering the natural environment eventually led them 
to fancying themselves as being other-than-nature.
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As well as urging historians to shift their attention away from historical to 
geological time, proponents of the new challenge seek to undermine what they 
see as the unacceptable dichotomy between the subjects of traditional history 
(human agents) and the object (nature), a dichotomy that they see as integral 
to the distinction between the natural and the historical past. The realization 
that human activity is responsible for global warming and the ensuing ‘natural’ 
catastrophes undermines the distinction between the traditional agents of 
history (humans) and the immutable backdrop against which their deeds take 
place (nature). As Chakrabarty puts it, climate scientists, in positing ‘that the 
human being has become something much larger than the simple biological 
agent than he or she has always been …’, are ‘unwittingly destroying the 
artificial but time-honoured distinction between natural and human history’ 
(Chakrabarty 2009: 206). In traditional histories nature is portrayed as an 
unchanging ‘silent and passive backdrop’ (Chakrabarty 2009: 203), against 
which human history unfolds; it only makes sporadic appearances in historical 
narratives when it either facilitates or somehow hinders human endeavours. 
The weather, for example, is mentioned in Second World War histories because 
on 7 December 1941 the clear skies made the Japanese attack on the American 
base in Pearl Harbour easier or, in histories of the Great War, because persistent 
rain weakened the structural integrity of the trenches on the western front. But 
in traditional histories nature is generally portrayed as a constant backdrop 
against which human affairs unfold. It is seen as the ‘other’ of history: whereas 
civilizations change, the seasons alternate in an eternal recurrence of the same 
natural cycle, indifferent to human turmoil and unaffected by it. This view of 
nature as the other of history, an external and static backdrop indifferent and 
impregnable to human action, is shattered by the discovery that human activity 
is the catalyst for global warming, that deforestation and the industrialization of 
farming play a role in the process of climate change that is not different in kind 
from the one that, for example, microbes play in the development of diseases. The 
science of climate change shows that just as the balance of nature would remain 
inexplicable without taking into account the ‘actions’ of living organisms, so the 
disruptions to the natural cycles that have for so long been taken for granted 
could not be explained without the agency of humans. The Anthropocene brings 
the realization that human agency is the catalyst of climate change, that humans 
are geological forces of nature (Latour 2017: 92 ff.) just as Pasteur demonstrated 
that sugar could not be transformed into alcohol without the presence of yeast. 
The dividing line between a dead or de-animated nature that can be explained 
by appealing to physics and chemistry alone and history, to be understood, on 
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the other hand, teleologically, as the achievement of the goals of human agents, 
is shattered by the twin realization that just as the balance of nature could not be 
accounted for without taking into consideration the actions of living organisms, 
so the disruption to this balance cannot be accounted for without taking into 
account the actions of humans. The onset of the Anthropocene therefore 
challenges not only the distinction between human agents as the subject of 
history and a dead/deanimated nature to be understood mechanistically rather 
than teleologically; it also challenges the distinction between the agents that 
feature in traditional histories and other kinds of agents: microbes, yeast and 
so on.
As the distinctions between history and nature, between historical and other 
kind of agents comes under attack, so does the view that there are different modes 
of understanding that correspond to the (allegedly) distinctive explananda of 
the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften. Bruno Latour claims that 
the way one understands the working of General Kutuzof ’s mind in Tolstoy’s 
War and Peace is not significantly different from the way one understands how 
the Corticotropin releasing factor works. The reason why one might find it easier 
to grasp the psychology of the general in Tolstoy’s novel than a scientific text 
describing the function of the factor releasing Corticotropin is simply due to 
lack of familiarity with the scientific context (Latour 2017: 49 ff).10
The distinction between nature and culture also becomes the target of 
gentle mockery as the question ‘Don’t the historical beings who feature as main 
characters in traditional histories have a natural environment as well as a culture?’ 
is teasingly posed. Sloterdijk, for example, asks whether Dasein does not have a 
habitat as well as a ‘world’ in the Heideggerian sense (a language, a culture a 
history). ‘When you say that the Dasein is thrown into the world, into what it 
is actually thrown? What is the composition of the air it breathes there? How 
is the temperature controlled?’11 The nature-culture distinction presupposed by 
the notion of a distinctively historical past leads not only to an unacceptable 
dichotomy between humans and the rest of nature; it also treats historical agents 
as if they were ethereal creatures who do not need to eat, breathe and perform 
any physiological functions, or so the argument goes. These objections are 
closely interlinked: if there are no distinctive historical agents, then there is no 
significant difference between culture and habitats and no distinctive methods 
for studying them are required as a result.
The new challenge questions the methodological distinction between 
different modes of understanding as based on an unacceptable ontological 
distinction between humans and the rest of nature. Once the ontological 
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distinction between subject and object in its various manifestations (historical 
time vs geological time, historical subjects vs the object [nature]; historical 
agents vs other non-historical agents, humans vs other lesser beings) is rejected, 
so too are the methodological distinctions that underpin the study of nature 
and culture, the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften. From 
the perspective of the new challenge, the nature-culture distinction which 
emerged in the twentieth century and which was invoked to defend the idea of a 
distinctively historical past12 is at best humanity’s ultimate delusion of grandeur 
and at worst a self-destructive ideology invoked by the human species to justify 
the exploitation of nature, just as the idea of the free market functioned as the 
ideology through which the emerging bourgeoisie sanctioned the exploitation of 
the working classes. Bonneuil and Fressoz, for example, advocate going ‘beyond 
the great separation’ of nature and culture, of ‘the natural sciences with their 
non-human objects’ and the ‘a-natural’ humanities and social sciences, the 
former postulating ‘physical continuity between human and other entities’, the 
latter ‘defined by a metaphysical discontinuity between humans and everything 
else’ (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016: 32). The Anthropocene, they argue, once it is 
recognized ‘as the reunion of human (historical) time and Earth (geological) 
time, between human agency and non-human agency, gives the lie to this – 
temporal, ontological, epistemological and institutional – great divide between 
nature and society’ (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016: 32). The temporal divide between 
human and geological time, the ontological divide between humans and the rest 
of nature, the epistemological/methodological divide between the humanities 
and science all stand or fall together, the result of the same unacceptable dualist 
metaphilosophical standpoint.13
The same boring old conceptual distinctions?
Does the nature-culture distinction that is presupposed by the defence of a 
humanistically oriented historiography either rest on or entail an ontological 
distinction between humans and the rest of nature? To see why the considerations 
raised by the new challenge fundamentally misconstrue the assumptions on 
which the idea of a distinctively historical past rests one needs to understand 
what kind of distinction the nature-culture distinction is. As intimated earlier, 
nature and culture are the explicanda of two different modes of inquiry with 
distinctive methods and investigative goals.14 The nature-culture distinction 
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captures a joint or juncture in the way reality is conceptualized in different areas 
of inquiry; it does not ‘cut reality at the joints’. It is not a Cartesian15 (real or 
metaphysical) distinction entailing that historical subjects/agents could exist 
without a physical body, that there could be culture without nature, a ‘World’ 
(in the Heideggerian sense)16 without a habitat, in the way in which Descartes 
argued that the concept of mind, being really distinct from that of the body, 
could exist apart from the body. Defending the nature-culture distinction does 
not, for example, entail denying that the Egyptians and the Mesopotamians ate 
and breathed, or that their bodies aged and eventually decayed. What it entails, 
rather, is that it is not with their physiological functions that the Egyptologist (qua 
humanistically oriented historiographer) is concerned. Collingwood ([1946] 
1993), whose philosophy of history loomed large behind Dray’s defence of the 
autonomy of historical explanation against Hempel’s claim for methodological 
unity in the sciences, put the point as follows:
A great many things which deeply concern human beings are not, and never 
have been, traditionally included in the subject-matter of history. People are 
born, eat and breathe and sleep, and beget children and become ill and recover 
again, and die; and these things interest them, most of them at any rate, far more 
than art and science, industry and politics and war. Yet none of these things 
have been traditionally regarded as possessing historical interest. Most of them 
have given rise to institutions like dining and marrying and the various rituals 
that surround birth and death, sickness and recovery; and of these rituals and 
institutions people write histories; but the history of dining is not the history of 
eating, and the history of death-rituals is not the history of death. (Collingwood 
1999: 46)
Collingwood’s point is not that it is not possible to write natural histories. Nor is 
he advocating a linguistic reform and arguing that the term ‘history’ should be 
reserved to denote histories of a certain kind, those which have been concerned 
with rituals rather than physiological facts. But while we may continue to speak 
as we wish, we should be wary of the bewitchment that words can exercise 
on our intelligence17 and assume that because we use one and the same word, 
‘history’, there is no difference between the subject matter of the Egyptologist, 
or of the historian of ancient Rome, and that of the palaeontologist. Nor does 
it follow from the fact that the humanistically oriented historiographer and the 
natural scientist have different interests that there exist different kinds of beings, 
material and immaterial beings, res cogitans and res extensa, that correspond to 
their different subject matters.
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At times it is philosophers, more than ordinary people, who tend to be under 
the spell of words. The Gladstone Pottery museum in Stoke-on-Trent18 traces the 
history of the toilet from the humble chamber pot to the modern flushing toilet. 
Museum visitors are not normally surprised to find that the chamber pots and 
toilets on display contain no human excrement. If they are not surprised, this is 
because, echoing Collingwood, they tacitly acknowledge that the history of toilet 
rituals is not the same as the history of a physiological function. They do not infer 
from the fact that no human excrement is contained in the chamber pots and 
toilets on display, that the beings who used them were angel-like creatures who 
never needed to relieve themselves. Yet it is precisely this sort of inference that 
gives rise to the glib question ‘Does Dasein not have a habitat? Does it not breathe? 
What kind of temperatures can it withstand?’ Defending the irreducibility of the 
Geisteswissenschaften to the Naturwissenschaften is not tantamount to assuming 
an ontological separation between humans and the rest of nature; it is rather to 
make the point that the concept ‘historical agent’ is sui generis and irreducible to 
that of ‘natural agent’ and to advance an argument for the existence of disciplinary 
boundaries that reflect the different concerns and investigative goals of science 
and the humanities. The new challenge gets the direction of fit between ontology 
and epistemology upside down: the argument against methodological unity 
in the sciences was premised on the metaphilosophical assumption that there 
is a reciprocal relation between method and subject matter, that nature is the 
explanandum of science, just as culture is the explanandum of history; it was not 
premised on the assumption that the methods of the Geisteswissenschaften and 
the Naturwissenschaften are different because mind and nature are metaphysical 
entities which can be known ‘as they are’ independently of the investigative goals 
of history and natural science. Defending the nature-culture distinction and the 
possibility of a humanistically oriented historiography does not mean providing 
an argument for metaphysical dualism,19 or being committed to it by default. It is 
to argue, rather, for the disunity of science, for the claim that science and history 
ask different kinds of questions and therefore that, just as the questions asked by 
scientists are not answered by the methods of history, so the questions asked by 
historians are not answered by adopting the methods of science.
Yet, quite often, when one mentions the old debate for and against 
methodological unity in the sciences one is met with a yawn: how boring, how old 
hat, you are stuck in the 1950s! Since then much work has been done to show that 
there are different models of causal explanation that do not invoke generalizations, 
such as, for example, counterfactual accounts of causation. Since the argument for 
the unity of science as articulated by Hempel was based on a nomological account 
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of causal explanation, defending the inapplicability of this nomological model to 
a humanistically oriented historiography is tantamount to fighting a strawman. 
The nomological model of explanation, so the objection goes, has long been 
superseded, and the debate between those who defended it and those who 
attacked it is stale. But whatever one might think about the nomological model 
of causal explanation (it is not my intention to take sides on whether causation 
should be understood in terms of regularities or counterfactuals), adopting 
a counterfactual rather than a nomological account of causal explanation 
does not undermine the distinction between the space of reasons and that of 
causes, the very distinction which was at stake in the old debate for and against 
methodological unity. Those who argued against methodological unity in the 
sciences did so on the grounds that the actions of historical agents must be 
understood in an intensional context, if they are to be understood historically at 
all. To illustrate, suppose that a tourist from a distant galaxy with no knowledge 
of the Catholic faith arrived on earth when the cardinals are gathered in 
Conclave. One day the tourist notices crowds in St Peter’s square cheering and 
wonders why, since she noticed no such cries of jubilation the previous day. 
Yet the weather was the same, the air temperature similar and the merchants 
selling silk scarves were positioned in exactly the same spots. She consults video 
footage of the previous days and notices one difference: the colour of the smoke. 
On the day in which the crowds cheered, unlike the previous days, the smoke 
was white, not black. Having spotted this difference the tourist concludes that 
the crowds cheered because the smoke was white and that, had the smoke been 
black, they would not have cheered. She has provided a counterfactual causal 
explanation for the cheering of the crowds. Now, even if one were to concede 
that the intergalactic tourist could isolate the white smoke as the relevant 
counterfactual (why not the fact that, on the day the crowd cheered, the silk 
scarves on the merchants’ stands were a different colour, or the bored kids 
screaming their heads off were positioned in a sunny rather than a shady spot of 
St Peter’s square?), this counterfactual does not explain, in a particular sense of 
‘explain’, why the crowds cheered. For the crowds did not cheer on account of the 
white smoke. They cheered because the cardinals gathered in Conclave elected a 
new leader of the Catholic Church.20 Even if the tourist succeeded in providing 
an explanation for the crowds’ cheering that would enable to predict similar 
behaviour in the future,21 this kind of explanation still singularly fails to capture 
the symbolic significance of the white smoke; it does not explain the cheering of 
the crowds in the way in which the tourist would like the event to be explained 
if she were a historian.22 If the intergalactic tourist were a historian she would 
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ask what the white smoke meant to the crowd, what is its symbolic significance, 
just as the Roman historian is interested not merely in the fact that in 49 BC 
some men with shields and horses waded across a stream (which later historical 
narratives glorified by calling it a river) but in what the crossing of that stream 
by a provincial governor meant to a Roman senator. The historical context of 
explanation is an intensional context in which the reaction of the crowds to 
the white smoke is understood against the background of the Catholic faith, 
just as Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon is understood in the context of Roman 
Law. A counterfactual explanation that limits itself to an extensional context, 
to the occurrence of white smoke emanating from a chimney, for example, but 
ignores the intensional context (the significance of the white smoke for the 
Catholic faith) may at best be able to predict or retrodict the behaviour of the 
crowds, but it would fail to explain it in the way that would satisfy the curiosity 
of the intergalactic tourist if the tourist were after a particular kind of historical 
explanation. Understanding the past historically, as Winch puts it, is a reflective 
or conceptual task:
Historical explanation is not the application of generalizations and theories to 
particular instances: it is the tracing of internal relations. It is like applying one’s 
knowledge of a language in order to understand a conversation rather than like 
applying one’s knowledge of the laws of mechanics to understand the workings 
of a watch. (Winch [1958] (1990): 133)
Winch contrasts historical explanations to generalizing/nomological ones; 
but his claim that we understand an event historically in the way in which we 
understand a language stands, whether or not one believes the (nomological) 
model of explanation to be an outdated model. Winch’s point is that just as 
someone who has mastered the English language knows (by entailment) that 
if something is a washing machine then it is an electrical appliance, so if you 
are a Roman (or a Roman historian) and you know Roman Law then you know 
(by entailment) that crossing the Rubicon with an army signifies challenging 
Republican Law. Just as the concept of washing machine analytically entails that 
of electrical appliance, so Roman Law entails that certain acts are punishable 
transgressions. To understand Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon as a challenge to 
Roman Law is to subsume human agency under a certain kind of explanation, 
one that is rather different from that used to explain human agents qua catalysts 
for climate change, that is, as beings that play a role in global warming analogous 
to that which yeast plays in the process of fermentation. For while scientists 
have discovered empirically that a certain kind of human action (deforestation 
BLO_12_PHOH_C012_docbook_new_indd.indd   16 28/04/2020   10:02:02
17In Defence of a Humanistically Oriented Historiography
and the burning of fossil fuels) causes global warming, historians understand 
the magnitude of Caesar’s wading across of small stream because they know the 
‘grammar’ of Roman Law.
The defence of a humanistically oriented historiography against the old 
challenge rests on the consideration that in order to understand an event 
historically one must go beyond a purely extensional context of explanation. This 
consideration is not rendered obsolete by the claim that since counterfactual 
causal explanations need not invoke covering laws, the argument against 
methodological unity articulated by Dray, Winch and others was directed at a 
straw man. Counterfactual causal explanations, just like nomological ones, miss 
the significance of the white smoke and of the crossing of the Rubicon because 
they do not consider how things appear or look like for that being who (as 
Heidegger says) has ‘an understanding of Being’. A history of how humankind 
sleepwalked into global warming along the lines of Christopher Clarks The 
Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (Clarks 2012), cannot simply be 
a history of the consequences that deforestation, the industrialization of farming 
and the burning of fossil fuels have on the earth’s climate because only agents 
who can rethink who they are and reconceptualize their relationship to their 
habitat could possibly be awoken from their environmental slumber. The facts of 
climate science can be understood as wake-up call to alter the way one lives only 
if one presupposes precisely what advocates of the new challenge at times appear 
to be to denying, that is, that there is a distinctive kind of (historical) agent that is 
the correlative of a distinctive kind of (historical) explanation, one, to say it with 
Heidegger again, who has an understanding of Being.
The argument for the possibility of a humanistically oriented historiography 
was not an argument in support of some sort of ontological or metaphysical 
dualism but an argument in support of the existence of disciplinary boundaries 
between science and history, one motivated by the consideration that historians 
and scientists have different concerns. Since interdisciplinarity is the buzz word 
of the day, and an argument for the existence of disciplinary boundaries could 
easily be misconstrued as an attack on the very idea of interdisciplinarity, it is 
important to take some time to explain that defending the idea of disciplinary 
boundaries does not mean belittling the importance of cooperation among 
disciplines. Consider, for example, the relationship between crime detection and 
forensic science. Detectives enlist the help of forensic scientists to establish the 
location and time of a crime scene. By learning that the grit under the victim’s 
fingernails originates from a remote area of the country that was inaccessible to 
the prime suspect at the time of the crime, a detective will then be able to rule 
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out the suspect from their investigation. The detective’s goal is not to know the 
chemical composition of the grit; it is to solve the murder mystery, but she would 
not be able to infer that the prime suspect could not have been present at the 
crime scene without the assistance of the forensic scientist. Architects choose 
cladding materials with fire-retardant properties or glass panels which prevent 
homes from losing heat. But it is not their job to know what chemical composition 
the cladding panels must have in order to be fire-retardant or what scientific 
properties the glass must have to prevent the heat from escaping. Cooperation 
of this kind, between say, the detective and the forensic archaeologist (or the 
architect and the chemist), does not require denying that mutually supportive 
spheres have different goals. So understood, interdisciplinarity requires 
acknowledging the distinctive goals of, say, the detective and the forensic 
archaeologist, the architect and the chemist; in fact, interdisciplinarity makes 
no sense except against the background of disciplinary boundaries. The goals of 
those who argue that, in response to the Anthropocene, we should develop new 
‘environmental humanities’ (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016: 288) can be achieved by 
putting the knowledge that is generated in biology, chemistry and physics at the 
service of architects, town planners, garbage disposal firms, just as the police can 
avail itself of the assistance of forensic science. Chakrabarty is absolutely right 
in saying that ‘the crisis of climate change calls on academics to rise above their 
disciplinary boundaries because it is a crisis of many dimensions’ (Chakrabarty 
2009: 215). But rising above disciplinary boundaries is not the same as undoing 
them. There is no need to dissolve the historical past into the geological past or 
to undo the nature-culture distinction in order to change human habitats and 
foster environmentally friendly ways of living. What is required is joining the dots 
between, for example, chemistry and architecture so that the knowledge gained 
in one sphere can be mobilized to achieve the goals of another, just as forensic 
science has become a tool in crime detection. To acknowledge the existence of 
disciplinary boundaries and to understand interdisciplinarity as the interlocking 
of different spheres with distinctive methods is not synonymous with being an 
enemy of interdisciplinarity. Nor does understanding interdisciplinarity as the 
interlocking of distinctive spheres with their own distinctive goals and methods 
entail a commitment to the view that science can fix it all, that there is a purely 
technological solution to the problems of climate change.23 The defence of the 
possibility of a humanistically oriented historiography, one must remember, is 
premised precisely on the assumption that scientism, understood as the view 
that science has the answer to all questions, precludes the possibility that the 
past could be understood as a response to self-given norms and thus that the 
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future could be shaped through political agency just as the historical past was. 
Undoing the nature-culture distinction is not the key to solving the climate 
crisis24 because it is only in so far as one acknowledges the idea of historical 
agency that one can also make room for the possibility that the future may be 
shaped by the adoption of environmentally friendly norms rather than simply 
anticipated, in the way in which one expects rain after consulting the weather 
forecast.
Before drawing to a close I should make clear (again) that defending 
a humanistically oriented historiography is not the same as defending an 
anthropocentric historiography that excludes in principle the possibility of 
ascribing historical agency to non-human animals. The concept of ‘human’ 
and that of ‘historical agent’ are as distant as the concept of ‘human’ and that 
of ‘Dasein’. Lizards or aliens from a distant galaxy can be historical agents if 
they have what Heidegger calls ‘an understanding of Being’. Some animals – 
dolphins, elephants, higher primates – may have historical agency. This chapter 
is not concerned with determining who does or does not have historical agency, 
but with the more general point that the history of those beings (human or 
not) who do have a culture cannot be the same as the history of those beings 
(human or not) who do not have it: if there are beings who have a culture, then 
they have to be understood in a different way from beings who do not have it, 
as distinctive kinds of agents, and this is what distinguishes a humanistically 
oriented (which is not the same as human) history from other kinds of history. 
It is clearly possible to write animal histories,25 but the question still remains as 
to what kind of history one should write about animals. The objection that the 
nature-culture distinction rests on a form of human exceptionalism conflates 
the distinction between different types of inferences or explanations with the 
distinction between two kinds of beings: human and non-human. A defence 
of a humanistically oriented historiography is therefore not an argument for 
speciesism; it is rather an argument against a new and subtler form of naturalism 
that seeks to deny the existence of methodological differences between forms of 
inquiry by undoing the distinction between nature and culture.
Conclusion
There is something politically progressive about the literature on the 
Anthropocene and resulting reflections on what entering this new geological 
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epoch may entail for the writing of historical narratives. It may be no coincidence 
that the analogy of ‘the house on fire’ recently used by Greta Thunberg26 to 
describe the need for urgent action against climate change is to be found, and 
perhaps originates, in Latour’s Facing Gaia.27 Those who contrast human time 
with geological time philosophize in response to the challenges of our times. 
These reflections on the nature of time, whether it should be subdivided into the 
Holocene and the Anthropocene, rather than, say, the Elizabethan, Victorian 
and Edwardian eras, are not the musings of philosophers living in an ivory 
tower. In comparison to these reflections the debates concerning the nature of 
time which rage in contemporary analytic metaphysics between enduratists and 
perdurantists,28 on whether or not time is a fourth dimension such that – if only 
we had the right means of transport – we could travel through it like Dr Who, 
may seem like indulgent scholastic disputes whose participants are no better 
than Nero, playing the lyre as the world is burning. But while there is no denying 
that we should be shocked by the Anthropocene, undoing the nature-culture 
distinction is not the right response to its onset since humans, understood not 
as a biological species of featherless bipeds but precisely as interpreting as self-
interpreting beings, are the only ones who may be able to respond to the climate 
crisis. As Jeff Malpass said in a conversation at a recent conference on the role 
of the philosophy of history, ‘The birds and the bees are not going to save us.’29 
There is no contradiction in describing humans (qua biological beings) as the 
cause of climate change and humans (qua historical agents) as the potential 
solution to it. It is just that, when human actions are explained causally, their 
behaviour is explained as if it were like that of the sunflower which turns towards 
the sun, rather than like that of Roman legionaries obeying the commands of 
their centurion. We often switch seamlessly from one explanation to the other. 
When, for example, I reprimand my daughter for not picking the wet towels off 
the bathroom floor, I treat her as capable of responding to the norms of common 
living. When, on the other hand, I tell my partner ‘Don’t bother to reprimand 
our (lovely) teenager for banging the door: it is not her; it is her hormones’, I 
treat my daughter as a force of nature. No parent of a teenage daughter needed to 
wait for the onset of the Anthropocene to learn that humans are forces of nature. 
What the Anthropocene has taught us is the extent to which these causal powers 
extend, not the fact that we have them.
The recent challenge to a humanistically oriented historiography hypostatizes 
the methodological distinction between different forms of explanation and, as 
a result, erroneously identifies their respective explicanda with the ontological 
distinction between biological humans and the rest of nature. In seeking to 
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combat human exceptionalism by rejecting the disciplinary boundaries between 
the human and the natural sciences it undermines the possibility of historical 
agency. In so doing, it inadvertently threatens to make the historical future 
as inevitable as the natural past. What appears to be a politically progressive 
argument motivated by the noble intention of curbing disrespect for the rest of 
nature (a clearly laudable goal) comes dangerously close to endorsing a fatalistic 
outlook that forecloses the possibility of taking affirmative action against climate 
change. This is what is ultimately at stake in defending the nature-culture 
distinction and why protecting it is important. It is not qua natural but qua 
historical beings that we can act to halt or to reverse what we started, to avoid 
the environmental catastrophe that climate science warns us about. The role of 
the philosophy of history is not to encourage a form of fatalism born out of the 
abolition of the nature-culture distinction rather than, say, out of belief in divine 
providence, or a commitment to old fashioned reductive naturalism, but rather 
to appeal to our historical nature to bring about those changes which it is still 
possible to bring about.
BLO_12_PHOH_C012_docbook_new_indd.indd   21 28/04/2020   10:02:04
22 Philosophy of History
BLO_12_PHOH_C012_docbook_new_indd.indd   22 28/04/2020   10:02:04
